INTRODUCTION
There is widespread agreement that achieving the very substantial reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions necessary to stabilize GHG concentrations at 450 to 750 parts per million (ppm) will require innovation and large-scale adoption of GHG-reducing technologies throughout the global energy system. 1 The associated policy debate is therefore not so much over the importance of new technology per se in solving the climate problem, but rather over what the most effective policies and institutions are for achieving the dramatic technological changes and associated emission reductions necessary for stabilization.
Although many policies and institutions relevant to green innovation have been discussed, one area to which relatively little attention has been paid until recently is intellectual property rights (IPRs). The absence of attention may stem from the reality that IPRs are, by design, decentralized, market-driven incentives that presume appropriate market signals on the demand side. In the area of green innovation, by contrast, the primary problem has been the absence of appropriate greenhouse gas (GHG) pricing and hence the absence of an appropriate demand side signal. However, assuming the demand side problem is fixed (through interventions such as carbon taxes or cap and trade systems,) 2 then the issue of how IPRs -and various alternatives to IPRs -can most usefully play a role in fostering the supply of green innovation will necessarily come to the fore.
In this report, we provide an analysis of how IPRs, and alternatives to IPRs, might operate in green innovation. Part I of the paper discusses the economics of green innovation, including the important role that will need to be played by the private sector. Because of the critical role of the private sector, demand side issues will need to be fixed in order for there to be an appropriate level of green innovation. Part II discusses the IPR issues, principally involving patents, that may arise if and when GHG externalities are addressed through the appropriate pricing of greenhouse gases. Because these problems will primarily arise in the future (if at all), we rely heavily in this Currently, more than 95% of global R&D takes place in OECD countries.
Thus Parts II and III primarily address IPR difficulties for R&D in these countries. However, if climate change is going to be addressed successfully, clean technology must be adopted globally. Thus, in Part IV, we examine at some length the international context. cuses on intellectual property buyouts, the potential for international R&D treaties, impediments to technology transfer that may be posed by IPRs, and the use of IPRs to stimulate indigenous innovation in developing countries.
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I. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
While the idea of balancing the atmospheric GHG stock by reducing the net GHG flow to zero seems simple enough, the technological reality of what it will take to do this is far from simple. Currently 69 percent of global anthropogenic GHG emissions come from fossil fuels such as oil, coal, and natural gas, which satisfy 81 percent of global energy supply. 3 The remainder of global energy is supplied by renewable energy (13 percent) and nuclear power (6 percent). 4 Stabilizing GHG concentrations will therefore require large-scale and widespread substitution toward energy technologies with low to zero net GHG emissions throughout the global energy system. New technologies may also be needed in other sectors to reduce GHG emissions, such as improved agricultural methods or crop varieties to reduce the conversion of forests (which sequester carbon) to farmland; improved technologies for biofuels that avoid raising corn prices and thereby spurring deforestation; and improved agricultural techniques to produce crops and raise ruminant animals with reduced emissions of methane and nitrous oxide.
To gauge, in economic terms, the magnitude of the innovation challenge presented by climate change, it is helpful to consider possible targets for GHG reduction and the projected costs of achieving these targets. If private-sector profit incentives are not clearly aligned with societal GHG reduction goals then any public R&D spending will likely push against an insurmountable tide. Conveniently, as discussed further in Part IV, the vast majority of innovative effort globally currently takes place in the developed countries that are expected to take the most significant initial steps towards implementing GHG emission pricing.
For GHG emission policy to provide an effective inducement to innovation, however, it is critical that the policy be credible to the private sector over the long-term. Given the sometimes substantial time lags between initial discovery and profitable market penetration, companies must be confident that there will indeed be sufficient demand once their innovations reach the market. Such confidence would be increased by domestic policies and international agreements that put in place GHG emission targets whose stringency is spelled out for many decades in advance, and that provide stable financial incentives across a wide array of technological solutions.
Of course, government funding of relevant basic research does exist and could grow beyond its current levels. Thus the discussion below addresses at some length the special IPR issues raised by publicly funded research.
II. GREEN TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A SURVEY OF THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS
As discussed in Section I, innovation in the climate mitigation arena faces an environmental externality problem not raised by other types of innovation.
The GHG externality must be addressed on the technology demand side, by putting a price on greenhouse gases. But the GHG externality does not represent the only potential barrier to innovation. In this section, we address IPR issues that need to be thought through, particularly as the GHG externality is increasingly addressed.
In recent years, a few analysts have begun to address how IPRs might affect 22 As discussed further below, the situation in biotechnology is less clear. 23 For example, there is some dispute about the extent to which firms in the information technology industries bother to examine the patent landscape. To the extent that they do not do such examination, they may not be deterred by patent thickets.
In certain cases the potential problems caused by patents do not involve transaction cost difficulties associated with licensing foundational research for follow-on work or negotiating patent thickets. Rather, the prospect of patents may lead to "too much" R&D -that is, rent-dissipating races. 24 On the other hand, even with new decisions from the courts, administrative processes are likely, for the foreseeable future, to continue to produce questionable patents. In the United States, the available evidence indicates that the PTO struggles to keep quality at acceptable levels. The PTO has fewer than 6000 examiners for the more than 400,000 patent applications filed each year. So the typical examiner has only a few days to examine an application on which the applicant may have spent many months. The examiner also bears the burden of proving a patent application is invalid.
Moreover, under the complex incentive-based compensation regime for patent examiners, accumulating disposal credits (or "counts") may be easier if the examiner grants a patent application rather than denying it. 29 28 The CAFC did, however, remand for the district court to reevaluate the royalty rate, as the opinion had given no reason for the decision to impose a fee of $25 for every Prius II, Toyota Highlander, Lexus RX400h manufactured during the remaining life of the infringed patent. 29 The question is not entirely clear because an examiner can also accumulate "counts" if a patent denial results in the applicant coming back with a repeat (or "continuation") application.
the President of the European Patent Office has expressed concern that the patent system is "drifting towards dysfunctionality."
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In addition to false positives in the form of improperly granted patents, there is also some possibility of false negatives. There are anecdotal reports that, in the last few years, the U.S. PTO has responded to complaints that it grants "too many" patents by routinely (and arbitrarily) denying patent applications the first time they are filed. Certainly the evidence indicates that the percentage of first applications that are denied has gone up in the last few years. Overall, the U.S. has a backlog of over 750,000 patent applications. The delays caused by this backlog have particularly severe implications for small firms that may use patents to attract venture capital.
The Case of Biotechnology
For purposes of thinking about green technology, biotechnology represents a particularly interesting area in which to investigate in some detail the effect of patents. Not only will green technologies such as second and third generation biofuels be based on biotechnology but the green technology sector, like the biotechnology sector, is likely, in the long run, to rely heavily on complex interactions between publicly and privately funded research.
The history of publicly funded research in biotechnology suggests several key lessons. First, where the invention in question is a publicly funded research platform that can be adopted by industry without transfer of tacit knowledge or follow-on investment, the conventional rationale for patenting publicly funded research -that patents provide incentives for such knowledge transfer and Unfortunately, at least in the U.S., the available empirical evidence indicates that institutions that make decisions on whether to seek patents on their publicly funded research, and on how to license patents that they have secured, do not always make these decisions in a manner that comports with the public interest in efficient technology transfer. 33 Thus there is reason to consider modifying laws such as Bayh-Dole that govern the patenting of publicly funded research, at least to the extent that they confer unfettered discretion over patenting to institutions that receive public funding.
In the case of research tools and platforms that are privately developed, patents are likely to be necessary. 
Second and Third Generation Biofuels
As a purported green technology, the "first generation" biofuel of corn-based ethanol is quite controversial: it necessarily creates a conflict between the use of plants for food and fuel, and it has a carbon emissions profile similar to that of fossil fuels.
In contrast, second and third generation biofuels are more promising. Second generation biofuels include cellulosic ethanol, which is made from non-food crop residues such as corn stover and wheat straw, or from timber and lumber residues. In the area of cellulosic ethanol, a major challenge is the phenomenon of "biomass recalcitrance," a term that refers to the natural resistance of plant cell walls to microbial and enzymatic decomposition. Another source of worry may be patents in the area of third generation biofuels such as those produced by synthetic biology. Unlike traditional recombinant DNA, which simply transfers one or more genes from one organism to another, synthetic biology aims to create standard, modular DNA parts that can be mixed and matched in different ways within a standard "chassis" organism. In the biofuels context, the designer organisms created through mixing and matching would be designed to take cellulosic feedstock and produce fuel. At the moment, synthetic biology is sufficiently removed from commercial application that current patent applications on items like microbial chasses (Craig Venter's firm Synthetic Genomics has applications pending on several such chasses) 45 are not likely to cover the inventions that will ultimately become the standard. But to the extent standardization is achieved in the future, the prospect of patents on synthetic biology standards raises the same concerns as existing patents on various ICT standards.
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Perhaps most notably, secret infringement, which (as discussed earlier) 47 is currently one prominent strategy for avoiding patent thickets in the context of biotechnology, may be less feasible when relevant platforms are standardized.
Photovoltaic Solar
Photovoltaic technology involves the use of panels to produce electricity when the panel is exposed to sunlight. While the first generation of this technology used crystalline silicon, the improvement process has involved applying thin In terms of aggregate patent numbers, the trends do not appear particularly dramatic. In the U.S., the number of patents issued annually in the solar area appear to be holding relatively steady (Fig. 2) . In the EPO, patent applications in the solar area grew about 11% between 1998 and 2007, lower than the 16% increase for alternative energy technologies generally.
Transportation: Hybrid Cars and Fuel Cells
As shown in Figure 2 
Proprietary Rights Beyond Patents
There is more at stake here than patents alone. Green technologies, particularly in the area of second and third generation biofuels, are likely to be heavily dependent on access to microbial materials and associated data that will have to be processed as part of the overall research trajectory. 48 The challenge is to enable scientists to access vast amounts of materials and data for upstream research, without compromising the possibilities of downstream commercial applications that may be patented.
In other words, if all we focus on are potential patent problems, we may miss problems caused by data protection techniques under copyright and sui generis laws (especially the EU Database Law, which now applies in some 50 countries) as well as restrictions on access to genetic resources in material transfer agreements. Our solutions would thus be incomplete because they would fail to address the risk that the scientific system, even when rendered compatible with traditional patent law, might be deprived of necessary data (covered perhaps by crown copyrights or crown database rights in the EU) or deprived of access to essential resource inputs, such as microbial strains held by repositories that restrict access to their holdings even for public scientific purposes. Hence efforts to design a worldwide microbial commons could significantly affect the pace and direction of patented technologies, including green technologies.
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III. ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL PATENTING AND LICENSING
We have already alluded to the need for legal change -perhaps most notably changes to administrative processes that currently do a poor job of granting high-quality patents in a timely manner. But even without such legal change, which may be difficult to achieve, much can be done to avert patent difficulties. illustrates well the central features of a pro-competitive pool. Contributing members of the pool agree to license the patent portfolio on a nondiscriminatory basis to all firms that request a portfolio license. Owners of portfolio patents are also free to license their own patents independent of the portfolio. The entity that administers the MPEG-2 pool is know as MPEG LA, and it receives an administrative fee out of royalties collected. The MPEG LA model has been adopted in a large number of similar situations involving patent thickets.
a. Technology Pools
As a conceptual matter, a package of innovations licensed under a nonexclusive license of this kind invites the world to make use of the package at will, while organizing the contributors to the package as de facto partners of all subsequent users, who labor under a contractually specified obligation to pay reasonable royalties for follow on applications. The more successful the package becomes, the more follow-on users it generates, and the greater are the "lottery effect" royalties paid to those who contribute to the package.
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In certain contexts, royalty free licensing might be adopted. In Other contributors include Nokia, Pitney Bowes, and Dupont. Whether firms will have incentives to contribute significant numbers of patents to this type of commons, and whether it will include patents that are ultimately useful for reducing carbon emissions, remains to be seen. In the context of other firm donations of patents to a commons (e.g. IBM's donation of patents relevant to the Linux operating system), the firms in question have had a financial incentive to contribute, as they make products complementary to the platforms covered by the patents in the commons.
b. Prizes
In addition to the traditional approach of using patents/licensing and basic research funding administered via grants, another option is inducement prizes 50 On the use of these types of non-exclusive licenses, also known as liability rules, see for achieving specific advances in GHG-reducing science and technology.
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The idea here is to offer financial or other rewards for achieving specific innovation objectives that have been specified in advance. The detailed process of selecting appropriate prize topics and crafting prizespecific rules (e.g., the type of contest, size of award, criteria for winning, method of choosing winner, whether patents will be sought on the targeted invention) 53 requires extensive consultation with experts and potential participants. Identification of particular technical and scientific challenges in GHG mitigation that could be fruitfully addressed through an inducement prize approach could be identified as part of the above systematic assessment.
Then the best institutional arrangements for administering the prize would need to be determined. Consideration would need to be given to the treatment of intellectual property arising from associated innovations (as with any joint R&D project), and to the development of terms for related licensing. 
a. Prizes and Other Funding in the International Context
Prizes could be particularly useful for advancing innovation specifically relevant to developing country climate mitigation and adaptation technology needs, given the relatively low market-driven inducement for innovation that may be present in those countries. 54 For similar reasons, the use of innovation prizes has been advocated for medical advances particularly relevant to developing countries (e.g., anti-malaria drugs). 55 One advantage of a prize approach relative to research grants in an international context is that it would not require choosing the winner of R&D funding in advance, which can become politically charged when researchers and research institutions reside in particular countries.
An internationally coordinated climate technology prize fund could be established for these purposes. While contributions for such a fund could be sought on an as-needed basis for specific projects, it would probably be advantageous to have larger-scale general funds that could then be prioritized to specific prize topics.
In addition to a prize fund, a fund that provided peer-reviewed research grants could also be established. A portion of this fund could be set aside for scientists and innovators in developing countries and thus provide them with opportunities and outlets for innovative proposals that do not otherwise exist at the present time. Invigorated and expanded international agreements on climate technology mitigation R&D coordination could be very valuable, particularly as countries increase R&D efforts and seek maximal impact in addressing this global problem. 62 The IEA is the best-positioned international institution to administer any such agreement(s) related to energy technology, although other international institutions may be more appropriate to engage for non-energy technologies. One concern with the existing IEA implementing agreements, however, is that they each have their own secretariats and operate independently. While this approach eases the need for more central administration, it may also suffer from overlap across agreements, and a lack of overall coordination and strategic vision.
G8, other major R&D-performing countries, and likely major developing country technology users, could therefore consider agreeing to an overall framework for knowledge-sharing and coordination of climate mitigation R&D efforts. 63 This framework could include a process whereby parties make regular submissions of a climate technology development plan, including R&D funding levels, current and future program plans, pertinent R&D policies, and other relevant information. In addition to such national submissions, the process could include an evaluation of existing climate technology agreements-with an eye toward identifying best practices and expanding, integrating, or suspending particular agreements-and draw from other related national level and international efforts by the European Union 64 , Japan, 65 the United States, 66 and IEA work in support of G8 and other processes. 67 At a minimum, the process would monitor progress, share information on individual national efforts in an integrated manner, and identify where overlaps and gaps exist across countries. 68 One mechanism under this framework could also include the development of roadmaps to assess the current development status of particular technologies, systems, and relevant areas of underlying science, including the identification of appropriate milestones and necessary R&D funding levels. The framework would also provide a more systematic means for improving the cost-effectiveness of R&D by identifying particular areas where it makes sense for individual countries to focus on sub-parts of an integrated overall package and areas where joint funding is sensible. An agreement could also set out general guidelines for expectations for the magnitude of task-sharing and cost-sharing across countries for collaborative R&D projects. This framework could also highlight the importance of human talent to both knowledge development and transfer, by helping to identify high-priority areas for scholarly exchange-including from developing to developed countries.
An international agreement could also be fashioned to increase domestic funding of climate technology R&D, analogous to internationally agreed emission targets for each country. 69 Research and Development. 71 The core country obligations in the proposal are for minimum levels of support for qualified medical R&D (both general and "priority" areas), measured as a share of GDP, according to a schedule varying by national income. Among other things, the proposal also identifies methods of qualified R&D financing (e.g., direct public support, tax expenditures, philanthropic expenditures, and certain business R&D).
Specifically with regard to energy, the IEA already collects annual data on public energy R&D spending by IEA countries, a process that could be adjusted if necessary to serve a more formal purpose. 72 Such an agreement could incorporate a "pledge and review" structure, and the necessary reporting on funding levels integrated with the regular climate technology development plan submissions described above. Targets could be structured On the negative side, however, there is evidence that the TRIPS Agreement has produced an adverse impact on access to essential public goods, especially in areas like public health and agriculture. And when thinking about potential problems in advance of their becoming acute in the environmental sector, it is well to remember that although the TRIPS agreement sets up a baseline of protection, it also has a variety of provisions that give developing countries some flexibility in addressing access issues.
Thus it is worth emphasizing that governments in developing countries can under TRIPS maintain relatively stiff standards of patentability. Of course, stiff standards of eligibility must apply without discrimination to both national and foreign innovators. But these same standards might widen the space in which local companies could reverse engineer foreign innovations that fail to qualify and still obtain, say, utility model rights or "compensatory liability" rights in incremental innovations of their own. These same regimes might also serve to protect small-scale innovations held by foreigners, without international community to address threats to the public good if and when
IPRs become an impediment.
e. Indigenous Innovation in Developing Countries
Much of the international climate negotiations, as well as the academic literature, have operated on the assumption that green climate-friendly technologies will primarily or exclusively be developed in wealthy countries, and will then need to be transferred to poor countries through private or public mechanisms. This model of innovation in wealthy countries and diffusion to poor countries has characterized other fields of technology, such as pharmaceuticals (discussed above). And it is underscored by the reality that years. 86 Foreign investors will add to these financial markets. This trend may be reinforced if the current credit market problems in the US and Europe continue and come to make investment opportunities in China, India and Brazil seem relatively more attractive.
Fourth, there is a nascent community of venture capital firms already at work in China and other major developing countries. This source of financing and entrepreneurial insight can be critical to small start-up firms.
Fifth, there is at least domestic demand for innovation to reduce emissions.
As China adds a new coal-fired electric power plant each week (and India adds one about every other week), its coal combustion yields not only CO2 but also SO2, NOx, fine particulates, and black carbon. 87 The public health damage from these co-pollutants is serious (in China, up to 750,000 deaths per year). 88 Moreover, this public health burden is increasingly recognized by those countries' leaders as both a drag on economic growth 89 and a source of political unrest. 90 Thus political leaders in these countries have incentives to promote domestic public R&D spending to reduce these emissions; and domestic pollution control policies in these countries may spur private investment in such domestic innovation.
Sixth, if the demand-side market failure of climate change is corrected with a price on carbon (via carbon taxes or a cap and trade regime), and if that policy applies to the major developing countries, then there will be incentives for innovation within those countries to reduce GHG emissions. For example, there would be incentives to reduce CO2 emissions from coal combustion (via, e.g. carbon capture and storage), and CH4 emissions from natural gas pipelines, ruminant animals and rice cultivation. If indigenous innovation can reduce these emissions at lower cost than through imported external innovation, the country would benefit from lower abatement costs (and from the opportunity to sell emissions allowances on the world market, if a cap and trade regime is adopted). technologies, as discussed in prior sections of this paper. 92 A fourth is the general ease of doing business within these economies. 93 Thus, it will be important to study the design of IPRs or alternatives to encourage green climate-friendly technological R&D in major developing In this report, we provide an analysis of how IPRs, and alternatives to IPRs, might operate in green innovation. Because IPR challenges are likely to arise (if at all) only after sufficient levels of innovation have been generated by a combination of appropriate GHG pricing and public funding, we rely heavily on analogies to existing technological sectors that are currently experiencing difficulties. In addition, because over 95% of global R&D is currently generated in OECD countries, we focus on these countries in our discussion of IPR challenges. However, if climate change is going to be addressed successfully, clean technology must be adopted globally. Thus, our paper concludes by examining at some length the international context. 
